Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics

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An excellent book for understanding the current state of play in British politics. Matthew Goodwin argues that the economic liberalism of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government combined with the cultural liberalism of Tony Blair's New Labour regime has created a political culture in the United Kingdom that is now just as polarised as that of America or continental Europe. The divide is now mainly between the university-educated, socially liberal, and pro-mass immigration elite on the one hand and the culturally conservative national populists on the other. The latter group tend to be more right-wing on cultural issues, but more left-wing on economics. But to keep spiked free we ask regular readers like you, if you can afford it, to chip in – to make sure that those who can’t afford it can continue reading, sharing and arguing. I found this to be a fascinating and determinedly objective analysis of the changing political alignments in Britain today. It examines the widening gulf between the ‘new elite (typically liberal progressive graduates with left leaning views)that runs the country and its institutions and the ‘Traditionalist’ majority (mostly non-graduate, patriotic, culturally conservative). It charts the rise of this new elite over the past 60 years as they supplanted the old land owning, aristocratic elite of the previous era. By prioritising the new graduate elite, as Jeremy Corbyn learned in 2019, Labour has been left dependent on voters concentrated in cities and university towns.’ Photograph: Oli Scarff/AFP/Getty Images That there are such echoes across the decades should not surprise us. The image of a distinct, new elite, defined by its education and values, and standing over the common people, has a long history, popping up throughout the 20th century. The roots of the contemporary debate about the new elite lie in the 1970s. The late Barbara Ehrenreich published with her husband, John, an essay in 1977 in which they coined the term “ professional-managerial class” (PMC). There had developed, they argued, a new class of college-educated professionals, from engineers and middle managers to social workers and culture producers, that was distinct from the middle class of old but essential to the functioning of capitalism. The Ehrenreichs were hopeful that this class could be mobilised for progressive causes. They warned, however, that it could also give rise to “what may at first sight seem to be a contradiction in terms: anti-working class radicalism”.

a b Malik, Kenan (16 April 2023). "This obsession with a 'new elite' hides the real roots of power". The Observer . Retrieved 24 April 2023. Goodwin, Matthew (2023). Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780141999098. There are several premises in Goodwin’s argumentation that, albeit not original, one would struggle to disagree with. For one, he is right to point out the erosion of significant differences between the two main political parties, Conservative and Labour, which have coalesced around the liberal consensus set up by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. He is also correct in linking that to the relative reduction in social mobility (from accountancy to architecture to acting), coupled with the rise of a new middle class that has benefitted from that liberal consensus and that has been increasingly detached from other social groups. Indeed, a significant part of this social group displays a broad liberal orientation on both economic and cultural matters. However, Goodwin uses these widely accepted observations to perform a series of logical and empirical leaps in the attempt to push a very transparent political agenda.

metropolitan middle-class for its votes while the Conservative Party appeals increasingly to working-class, non-university educated voters in former Labour heartlands (the " red wall"). [20] Goodwin recommends that political parties "lean into" this realignment, by moving "left on economics and right on culture". [21] [22] [23] The morning after the Conservatives under Boris Johnson won the 2019 general election Goodwin tweeted "it is easier for the right to move left on economics than it is for the left to move right on identity & culture." [24] Kenan Malik wrote that this view was based on an assumption the working class are socially conservative, and "the trouble with this argument is that the key feature of Britain over the past half century has been not social conservatism but an extraordinary liberalisation", citing examples such as attitudes to sexuality, premarital sex and interracial relationships. [24] Ford, Robert; Goodwin, Matthew (2014). Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. Routledge. ISBN 9780415661508. Matt Goodwin is an academic,bestselling author, pollster, and speaker known for his research on: politics, populism, elections, voting, public opinion, Brexit, Europe, academic freedom and more. He is Professor of Politics at Rutherford College, University of Kent, recently served as Senior Visiting Fellow at theRoyal Institute of International Affairs, at Chatham House, Senior Fellow with the UK In a Changing Europe, Senior Fellow at the Legatum Institute, and Senior Advisor to the UK Education Committee. In 2022, Matt was appointed Social Mobility Commissioner. He is forty-one years old and lives in London. The key difference between the traditionalists and the liberal elite is higher education. A large graduate elite has emerged with often extreme liberal views. Goodwin places the main blame on the universities which have morphed into ideological monocultures. When liberal cosmopolitan and progressive values are completely dominant, he argues, those who do not share them feel they cannot speak. Political minorities, such as conservatives and gender-critical scholars, are either marginalised or openly discriminated against.

Bland, Archie (14 April 2023). "Friday briefing: Has a 'woke aristocracy' really taken control of British society?". The Guardian . Retrieved 26 August 2023. The reason why education and age, not class and income, have become the main drivers of politics is because of the much greater influence that people’s cultural values are wielding over their decisions at the ballot box

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Matthew James Goodwin (born December 1981) [1] is a British academic who is professor of politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. His publications include National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (with Roger Eatwell) and Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics. As of September 2022 [update] he serves on the Social Mobility Commission. [2] Early life and education [ edit ]

Bloomfield, Jon. "Toxic Friends? A Critique of Blue Labour". The Political Quarterly . Retrieved 21 August 2023. Cutts, David; Goodwin, Matthew; Heath, Oliver; Surridge, Paula (2020). "Brexit, the 2019 General Election and the Realignment of British Politics". The Political Quarterly. Wiley. 91 (1): 7–23. doi: 10.1111/1467-923x.12815. ISSN 0032-3179. S2CID 214063692. Media Mole (11 June 2017). "Watch: Politics expert Matthew Goodwin eats his own book on live TV after underestimating Labour". New Statesman. London.

McGee, Luke (18 May 2023). "Why are some British Conservatives behaving like the next election is already lost?". CNN . Retrieved 18 August 2023. Rachel Aroesti welcomes the inclusion of Elton John in the V&A’s celebration of the diva, regrets the exclusion of Kendall Roy, and hopes the whole thing won’t ruin what makes divas great. “The diva is not supposed to be a wholly serious – or virtuous –proposition,” she adds. “She really doesn’t need to be reframed as an emblem of societal progress.” Archie

The sharp political divide that Luntz finds, whereby Labour voters are more than twice as likely as Conservative voters to describe themselves as woke, is magnified in Britain’s higher education institutions where Labour supporters outnumber their conservative counterparts by a ratio of about 8 to 1 among academics.Good Point James, I was just being provocative for fun – the troll in me is something I must always try to keep restrained. As an exercise, I followed up a random citation. On p101 of the Kindle edition, he says: 'These changes played a direct role in Labour's electoral collapse[...] Political appeals to the working class', conclude professors Geoff Evans and James Tilley, in their insightful study of how Labour's electorate unravelled over the last ten years, 'have now effectively disappeared from the lexicon of party politics.' The meaning of what he's saying is clear: that Labour, primarily under Miliband and Corbyn, have lost sight of the working class, with catastrophic consequences (ie the 2019 election).